



## Analysis of *Shi'a* Da'wah in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran-Sampang Villages, Madura (Religious Moderation Study)

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### Abstract


This article aimed to analyze *Shi'a* da'wah in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran-Sampang-Madura Villages using the theory of religious moderation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. This research was important because what is produced from *Shi'a* da'wah is one of the black records of religious life in Indonesia. The researcher used a qualitative method that is a case study, data was obtained through interviews, then analyzed thematically such as John W. Creswell's steps, while the validity of the data used triangulation of sources. The findings of this study revealed that there are several principles that were neglected in *Shi'a* da'wah in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran-Sampang Villages, Madura, namely ignoring the principles of justice and balance, the principles of amar makruf and nahi mungkar, the principle of comfort in religion and the principle of graduality. When this principle was disregarded, it is not surprising that da'wah efforts led to conflicts between Sunni communities that are rooted first and Shia groups as immigrant teachings. This research can be a reference material for da'wah practitioners in a multicultural society.

**Keywords:** Da'wah, Moderation, Religion

### Abstrak

*Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dakwah Syiah di Desa Karang Gayam dan Blu'uran-Sampang-Madura dengan menggunakan teori moderasi beragama dari Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. Penelitian ini penting karena apa yang dihasilkan dari dakwah Syi'ah merupakan salah satu catatan hitam kehidupan keagamaan di Indonesia. Peneliti menggunakan metode kualitatif yaitu studi kasus, data diperoleh melalui wawancara, kemudian dianalisis secara tematik seperti langkah-langkah John W. Creswell, sedangkan validitas data menggunakan triangulasi sumber. Temuan penelitian ini adalah ada beberapa prinsip yang diabaikan dalam dakwah Syi'ah di Desa Karang Gayam dan Blu'uran-Sampang, Madura, yaitu mengabaikan prinsip keadilan dan keseimbangan, prinsip amar makruf dan nahi mungkar, asas kenyamanan dalam agama dan asas bertahap. Ketika prinsip ini diabaikan, tidak mengherankan jika dakwah telah mengakibatkan konflik antara kelompok Sunni yang berakar terlebih dahulu dan kelompok Syiah sebagai ajaran imigran. Penelitian ini dapat menjadi bahan acuan bagi pelaku dakwah dalam masyarakat multikultural.*

**Kata Kunci:** Dakwah, Moderasi, Agama



## **A. INTRODUCTION**

As a missionary religion, Islam obliges its adherents to spread its teachings to all of humanity. This effort, known as da'wah, serves as an invitation to others. However, in preaching, it is not enough to simply convey what is considered right, but also in the right way and conditions. If any of these elements are violated, conflict within the community becomes a real possibility. Its initial purpose was to convey the truth, but eventually, it became hostility and division in society.

One example of an inappropriate da'wah effort can be seen in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages. What happened in Sampang was not merely a matter of faith. According to Afdillah, it originated from family feuds and positions in society, which had an impact on economic income. In fact, he explained that the two villagers involved in the conflict did not understand the real problem, but rather the emotions of faith and the teachings of each religious figure they respected. The conflict in Sampang occurred repeatedly in 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012, even the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security confirmed that a thousand people participated in the destruction of property belonging to Shia residents. The rampage left one person dead, six people from both sides injured and thirty-seven Shiite houses burned. As a result, seventy-one Shia families were displaced to the Sampang GOR Hall (Afdillah, 2016: 147).

What happened in Sampang has attracted many researchers to take part, especially in finding solutions to end the conflicts that have occurred, at least avoiding violence and casualties. The complex causes of these conflicts require diverse conflict management approaches. Research in the last five years has continued to discuss issues such as discrimination against Shia groups as carried out (Ramadhan, 2022). The relationship between religious fanaticism and conflict (Fauzi & Faidi, 2021), the urgency of multicultural education in building the unity of Muslims (Asrori & Maskuri, 2022), the offer of conflict resolution (Abd Hannan, 2023) (Musthofa & Yusup, 2021), the influence of the media on conflicts (Millatuz Zakiyah et al., 2022), political influence (Ikmal, 2021), and the government's failure to handle these conflicts (Siddiq et al., 2023). From these studies, the authors have not found any analysis of the conflict that occurred in Sampang-Madura through the study of religious moderation, so the author is interested in conducting such a study. For the record, the generalization of religious conflicts in a

region cannot be generalized because each region has different socio-demographic conditions. Therefore, understanding these differences in socio-demographic conditions in each region is important, as they determine the form, causes and ways of handling conflicts in each region (Jamaludin, 2021).

Moreover, the issue of trust does not need to be debated, because there is no peace institution that is sufficiently competent and universally accepted by all parties, if there are other parties as mediators, both as religious leaders and the government in power, their role is limited to stopping disputes. From the many polemics that occur continuously, it can be concluded that confrontational apologies, which aim to seek victory by defeating the other party, never produce positive results. In terms of belief, society is unwilling to be persuaded solely by rational arguments, but must also consider the non-rational and suprarational elements that play an important role in a religion (Dodi, 2017). The causes of conflict are varied, including theological, political, economic, social aspects, government hesitancy, *Ahmadiyya* exclusivity in worship, and the influence of mass media reporting (Zuldin, 2016: 438–448).


*Da'wah* that fails to consider the social conditions of the local community eventually causes conflicts (Hasiolan Nasution, 2022: 19–38). The Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia has published a book entitled "Religious Moderation" to promote a peaceful and calming religious situation. This article aimed to examine the *da'wah* efforts in Sampang with the principles of moderation standards published by the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. It is expected that *da'wah* activities in the future will be able to eliminate conflicts that occur in the community, especially in the name of religion. Indeed, in a democratic country like Indonesia, radical groups have more room to spread their teachings on the grounds of freedom of speech (Hilmy, 2015: 407–425). However, treating them with repressive-antagonists would also be counterproductive, as would giving *hasiola* a misleading label (Sajari, 2015).

## B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research employed a qualitative case study approach. Data was collected by directly observing two groups involved in the conflict, namely the *Shia* group in Sidoarjo and the *Sunni* group in Madura. In addition, the researcher also conducted live interviews

with a free or unstructured interview format. In this study, there were 6 informants, three representing the *Shi'a* group with the initials TM, S and NK who were taken during an interview at the Sidorajo Rusunawa on December 25, 2022. While the researchers also interviewed three people from the *Sunni* group with the initials M1, M2 and M3, the interviews were conducted in the village of Karang Gayam on December 26, 2022. The next step, the researcher conducted data analysis according to the stages offered by John W. Creswell as in the following table: (Creswell, 2014: 225)

**Table. 1** Data Collection Techniques, Data Analysis Techniques & Data Validity



## C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### 1. Characteristics of the Madurese people

The Madurese are an ethnic group native to Madura Island, some of whom also reside along the north coast of East Java and some of them are spread across West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and other regions. The island of Madura lies between 6 45' S – 7 15 LS and at 112 15' E – 114 '05 E. The area of Madura is 547,514 ha or 5,475.14 km. This area is divided into Sumenep Regency covering an area of 18,448 ha. Pamekasan Regency, 79,155 ha. Sampang Regency covers an area of 137,516 ha and Bangkalan Regency covers an area of 142,435 ha (Pamungkas, 2012).

During the colonial era, Madura was once by the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), which divided the island into three regions, namely West Madura, Pemekasan, and Sumenep and continued until the 19th century. Similarly, in practice, West Madura remained under the dominance of the VOC, functioning more as the relationship between the king and the commoners while the East Madura region (Pemekasan and Sumenep) was treated as a partner. The restraint carried out by the VOC also had an impact on the way the people of West Madura (Sampang and Bangkalan) communicated more spontaneously and seemed rude, as evidenced by the absence of

the subtle and rude division of language that prevailed in Pemekasan and Sumenep (Dharma, 2021: 16–21).

Majid himself also admitted that it was very difficult to avoid stereotypes and harsh stigmas when discussing about Madura. There are at least two reasons that reinforce the stigma. First, violence involving the Madurese is often associated with "carok". New violence can be considered as a joke if it is done between men to maintain self-esteem, potentially give birth to feelings of shame, and is a social encouragement and approval to gain satisfaction and prestige as a champion. Second, researchers often focus only on the conditions of the disharmonious Madurese society, especially in the form of violence (Majid et al., 2022).

In terms of religion, the majority of Madurese are Muslims. Islam entered Madura in the mid-15th century with a very strong influence, both seen in behavior and also seen in many Islamic boarding schools or educational institutions. Another piece of evidence is the existence of the Jami Mosque with beautiful architecture, founded in 1763 in Sumenep and still stands today. However, the original belief, that is, the belief in the wonders of spirits, ancestors, spirit beings, and so on, remained in some members of society. Informant M1 explained the attitude of the people of Karang Gayam towards religion, "Here, if it is only about property, if it is not about faith, God willing, there is something that dampens conflict, whether it is family or others. If it's a matter of faith for Madura, there is no offer" (M1, 2022).

On Madura Island, each district has a *Shia* community such as in Tolontoraja Village, West Dempo Village, Sana Daya Village, and Sobatar Village, but their presence is not as stable as what happens in Sampang. For example, the Shia community in Pemekasan coalesces seamlessly in a space of tolerance, as evidenced by the fact that sometimes Sunni mosques are used as a place to recite the kumail prayer (a prayer usually recited by Shiites every Friday night). Likewise, Shia groups often ask for Sunni names for their newborn children, and vice versa. Indeed, there has been no attempt to denounce the Shia community in the area. As for the Sumenep area, the Shia community concentrated in the city center also does not have excessive feuds, they unite in religious activities such as *tahlilan* and the birthday of the Prophet (Nabil, 2013: 07).

In the western part of Madura island, namely Bangkalan, which borders the Sampang area. The Shia community is located in Tanjung Bumi District, precisely in the village of Paseseh—directly adjacent to Sampang. If we reflect on the region, similar conflicts may occur as an implication of the Sampang conflict. The clerics in the Bangkalan area have created space for tolerance by refraining from labeling the Shia community as deviant. Instilling the value of tolerance can be pursued through multicultural education in the community (Sipangidoan Siregar et al., 2024: 99–111), national insight education (Pahmuddin & Fitriono, 2025) and integrating the values of moderation in each learning (Kurnia et al., 2024, pp. 64–76). Where every *ummah* is able to respect each other without anyone feeling threatened in their beliefs or accepting their social rights (Rofiana et al., 2024: 124–140). One of the activities that can build an attitude of tolerance is to carry out mutual cooperation activities with fellow local residents (Ayu Parasvati et al., 2024: 873–891).

## **2. The Dynamics of the Spread of Shia Teachings to Sampang-Madura**

The introduction of Shi'ah into Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages was carried out by a kiyai named Makmun. The Shia group that developed in Sampang, Madura was the Shia Imamiyah group (TM, 2022). The figure of Makmun became a very important figure in the spread of Shi'ah in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Village. The story of how Kiai Makmun first encountered Shi'ah teaching and then later engaged in da'wah to the surrounding community and then became the spread of Shi'ah in the Sampang area, two versions have developed (Ida & Dyson, 2015, p. 33). First, it began when Kiai Makmun received guests in the 1980s, namely his close friend who had just returned from Iran. This guest carried out a photo of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran's revolution in 1979. According to Antara, Iran appeared to be hostile to the United States to gain sympathy from Sunni groups because the country was besieged by Sunni Islamic countries. Iran sought to spread Shia ideology throughout the world and even has ambitions to seize the holy lands of Mecca and Medina. By appearing hostile to America, Muslims will feel sympathy for their courage in opposing the great enemy of Islam. This effort was quite successful, one of which in Indonesia, Shia teachings managed to infiltrate the top levels of the government and the Indonesian Ulema Council (Antara,

2013: 36–37). Although its influence on the wider community is not strong, its influence in the government is quite strong, TM commented (TM, 2022).

Second, clandestine dissemination occurred through Shia books brought by Kiai Makmun from Mecca. Iklil explained, when he was still in the 4th grade of elementary school, Kiai Makmun came home from Arabia and brought a photo of someone wearing a turban, who was later identified as Khomeini. Iklil also admitted that he reads a lot of books from his father, Kiai Makmun, especially since almost every year his father receives book shipments even though he has never been to Iran. Iklil also admitted that his father's admiration for Khomeini aroused sympathy for the Shia group, as evidenced by his decision to send Iklil and TM to study at YAPI, Bangil. Iklil also felt sympathy and chose to follow the Shi'ah because he reads historical accounts describing the massacre of the Prophet's grandson and even cut it into parts.

Shi'ah da'wah in Sampang-Madura, especially Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages, is divided into two periods, namely the period of Kiai Makmun and the period after the death of Kiai Makmun. First, Makmun does his da'wah secretly. In addition, Kiai Makmun prefers to follow the currents in his environment rather than criticize the teachings of the local community, so it is not surprising that during Kiai Makmun's time, there was a harmonious relationship between the two groups (Dharma, 2021: 14). According to M1's, during the Kiai Makmun period, Shia teachings did not spread widely to the local community and remained limited to themselves and their families (M3, 2022).

Second, the period after Kiai Makmun's death was continued by his son, TM. The steps taken by TM in preaching are very different from what his father, Kiai Makmun, did. Although TM was quite relaxed at first, time passed and he began to do da'wah openly. The influence of Shia teachings expanded especially after TM returned from Mecca in 1999. TM recounts how he began his introduction to Shia. While at the Yapi Islamic Boarding School, TM admitted that at that time there were already Shia seeds, such as being introduced to fiqh in five schools by adding Ja'fari schools besides Hanafi, M3i, Shafi'i, and Hambali. Before he had time to dig deeper, TM was dismissed by his parents because there was a problem that Ustadz Husein—the caretaker of the YAPI Islamic Boarding School—was affiliated with Shia. The decision was ultimately

appreciated by TM because if he had not been fired, he would likely have been sent to Iran and become a pure Shia while previously only a sympathizer. Despite TM's objections, he still followed his parents' instructions to move to Sayyid M3i. The reality faced in Arabia was not as imagined due to lack of finances, finally decided to work and not continue his studies. According to Tasul, the choice of work to meet the needs of life is very appropriate because it is sent through a broker so that it is under the auspices of the settlers (TM, 2022).

In the early days of TM da'wah, despite different beliefs, social relations with the population were well maintained and not distanced. This is evident, for example, from the fact that differences in understanding do not prevent Sunnis and Shiites from working together in the management of agricultural land. However, it is undeniable that TM and his family brought new values that not only differed from the local culture but also had the potential to change the established social order. There are several changes brought by TM.

First. New values that affect the central aspect of the life of the Madurese people, namely the relationship between the kiai and the community. For example, TM invites residents to celebrate the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday simultaneously in one place. This is different from the tradition of commemorating the Prophet's Birthday in general which is carried out alternately from house to house. Although theologically both believe in the importance of celebrating the Prophet's Birthday, this new practice not only brings new values but also impacts the pattern of social relations between the kiai and the community. The model of celebrating the Prophet's Birthday carried out together is not only considered more economical but culturally reduces the intensity of the relationship between the kiai and the community (Ahnaf & e, 2015, p. 19).

Meanwhile, TM has a reason why he does *maulid* at the mosque instead of going door-to-door, namely to save so that they can send their children to school. One way to save money is to combine the *maulid* event in the mosque, and people can donate as much as possible. If there is an excess of money, it is advisable to save it so that they can send their children to school. At that time, the implementation of the *maulid* event from house to house was very burdensome for the community, many were even trapped in debt to tribal loan sharks. Because to carry out *Maulid*, the host must provide a banquet



and even have to give envelopes to the kiai and his children. At this stage, TM was initially considered as a Muhammadiyah *madhhab* because it was anti-*maulid*. TM also realizes that *Maulid* is not included in the pillars of Islam, even if it is said to be the pillar of Islam, then *Maulid* will not be an obligation for those who cannot afford it. In fact, according to TM, one opinion says that the history of the celebration of *Maulid* as seen today dates back to the Fatimid dynasty, in Egypt.

Second, TM pays important attention to education because the world will enter the era of globalization, if the generation does not have enough education then the generation will be marginalized in the future, even TM reminds that the next generation will not be an immigrant boy. Tasul's concern is very reasonable because when the young generation does not bleed, the opportunity to get a job is also increasingly difficult so that they become unemployed. When they are unemployed, people will do anything like steal, rob, and even become methamphetamine dealers. According to TM, it is the responsibility of parents to think about the next generation, especially considering the fact that in Karang Gayam Village, many children have not graduated at the elementary level due to economic reasons (TM, 2022).

Third, Not only by making changes in the implementation of *Maulid*, TM also invites the community to prioritize an attitude of cooperation over wages, maintain cohesiveness, and respect the heritage of their ancestors in an attitude of cooperation. In addition, it invites the public not to be trapped in debt, especially to loan sharks who were very popular at that time. Even TM is also trying to find donors who are willing to finance their children who have the potential to be educated at least up to the high school level. Another fact that needs to be highlighted is the social conditions that TM faces. According to TM, the condition of the community at that time was very concerning, such as the rampant theft of cattle, while the thieves were not caught. Because he did not get a good enough response from the village, TM invited the community to take care of his village. In fact, in one case, TM and the community once caught a thief and reported him to the police, but the perpetrator was not arrested by the police.

Initially, people did not know that the teachings brought by TM were Shi'a. In the reading, the Sunni *ustadz* explained the division of Muslims in the last days into 73 groups and all Allah accepts was *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*. Then the recitation was

divided into two groups between Sunnis and Shiites. If one night there was a recitation by the Sunni group, then in the morning, TM immediately opened the recitation and denounced the Sunni teachings using speakers, this is also one of the causes of the anger of the Sunni group, explained M3 (M3, 2022).

TM as the successor of Shi'a teachings Kiai Makmun received resistance from his father's close relative, Kiai Karrar. What Kiai Karrar did was followed by local scholars who strongly opposed the spread of Shi'a, even intimidating them (Nabil, n.d., p. 14). Especially with TM's unpretentious figure and special rhetorical ability, he also played a role in gaining the sympathy of the residents. M2 is recognized by M2 as the people of Karang Gayam that TM is not only intelligent but also has a very high concern for the community. He was willing to do menial work such as bringing materials to build people's houses that teachers usually do not do. If anyone got sick, they will be helped immediately and if they did not have money, TM would pay for it. However, M3 regrets that these good deeds have a certain purpose, such as spreading Shi'a teachings slowly, especially in the end causing division (M2: 2022.).

### **3. Cultivating Shia Teachings**

In addition to social changes, there are indeed differences between religious rituals and religious teachings embraced by the local community. Some of the religious rituals and religious views practiced by the Shi'a group are divided into two groups, namely ritual and thought. The differences in terms of worship rituals are for example: First: Praying five times can be done on three occasions even though there is no reason according to the Sharia. So in Shi'a teachings, prayer times are called dawn prayers, night prayers, and afternoon prayers (M1, 2022). For example, when there was work and busyness, they perform zuhur and asr, maghrib and isha (M3, 2022). In contrast to the statements of M1 and M3, M2 said that it was difficult to prove whether they prayed like that because there was an attempt to spy on a mosque in Blu'uran Village which was controlled by the Shia group, they only gathered and did not even pray (M2, 2022).

As a former follower of Shi'a, NK asserted that in Shi'a teachings there was a teaching to pray even if there is no reason according to Sharia, but it was not practiced as such or only prays five times as is known in Sunni teachings (NK, 2022). For the

Shiites, who do not want to be named, they think that the issue of prayer is just a matter of interpretation. He agreed with the interpretation taken by the Shi'a and sometimes even practices it (TM, 2022). Demikain was also with TM who agreed to do eternal prayers in Shia teachings. Although TM now admits his mistake, based on the fact that apart from the mursal hadith, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) never did this every day, only once or twice. According to TM, the Shi'a view only looks different from the Sunni group.

Second, Lift takbir when you want to sit between two prostrations. Third. *Mut'ah* Marriage. *Nikah mut'ah* known as contract marriage is taught in Shi'a teachings. However, according to M2, it would be difficult to prove it because it was a secret act, especially since Sunnis and Shiites are so far apart, but M2 dared to guarantee that the teachings are taught correctly. There was a conversation M2 reported from a person close to TM: "It's good in my religion, it's good" he was asked, how good is it? Like you, his wife was prevented from borrowing me from my husband. Can't you? Even if my husband doesn't give it to me, he'll sin (M2, 2022)." NK himself as a former Shi'ah does not deny what was conveyed by M2, it's just that it is not practiced (NK, 2022). *Mut'ah* wants it to be considered that the teachings of Ja'far Sadiq are a lie because TM admits that after reading fiqh, Imam Ja'far Sadiq said that "he does not perform mut'ah among people except the striped nose and prostitutes". It's just that it is hidden and takes false hadith. While Imam Ali explains in their book, al-Kafi, or wasailu al-Shi'ah that "mut'ah was forbidden after the battle of Haibar (TM, 2022).

Fourth, the problem of adhan. In the adhan pronounced by the Shi'a group, there is the addition of the phrase "*wa ashhadu anna 'Aliyyan waliyu Allah*" (M1, 2022). Meanwhile, his testimony is different from M2 who states that the addition occurs in the pronunciation of the shahadah, namely *wa 'aliyuh nabiyu Allah, or waliyu Allah*, although M2 has not been able to confirm between the two words. As for the call to prayer, M2 admitted that he had never heard of it, one of the reasons was because it was quite far away (M2, 2022).

In addition to worship, there are also differences in terms of religious beliefs or views, for example: First, considering the Qur'an to be false. For the Shi'a group, the existing Qur'an is considered unoriginal because it has been reduced or added by the

Companions, especially Abu Bakr, Umar bin Khattab, and Uthman. M2 said that if indeed the Qur'an is not original, then why do they use the Qur'an printed by the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia? This shows inconsistencies in their opinions. While the original will be brought by Imam M1 at the time of its appearance. The view of the fake Qur'an is quite painful for the people of Karang Gayam Village because everyone realizes that the main reference book is the holy book of the Qur'an (M1, 2022). As a former follower of Shia teachings, NK said that the opinion of the fake Qur'an was a slander directed at them because it was evident that what they were using was the same Qur'an that the Sunni group read (NK, 2022). However, TM asserts that in Shia teachings, the current Qur'an is wrong (TM, 2022).

Second, criticizing the companions, especially Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman. These companions were insulted because they dared to collect the Qur'an, even though they were not descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (saw) and former people. Those who consider themselves friends are considered criminals and even considered apostates (M2, 2022). M1 even added that the three companions are now in Hell (M1, 2022). However, one of the Shi'a followers who lived in the flat said that for them the leader after the Prophet Muhammad was not Abu Bakr but Ali bin Abi Talib the reason was that the person who best understood a family was the members of the family itself, including the son-in-law. This is also reinforced by hadiths such as "*Man kuntu maula, fa haza Aliyun maula*", (Whoever made me a leader at that time, Ali was the leader) and the narration "*Ana madinatul 'ilm, fa Aliyun babuhu*", (I am the city of knowledge while Ali is the door).

While TM himself also agreed that they cursed the companions, it was just that the kiai at that time could not prove their mistake. For example, if you want to consider that those who curse his companions will be punished as human beings, then Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan was also a person because he ordered 'Amar bin 'Ash in the "Ghayah Muslih" to curse Ali bin Abi Talib, even that was done in every pulpit during Muawiyah's reign, and it is recorded in the history of the Sunni group (TM, 2022). Similarly, in Shi'a teachings, the companions, including the Prophet's wife, Aisha. They nicknamed Aisha with a very vile expression, namely *anjas min al-kilab wa al-khanazir* (more unclean than dogs and pigs). The reason given is that there is no evidence that requires the wife of the

prophet to be a believer or expert in heaven, while the Qur'an tells about the wives of the prophets, namely the wives of the Prophet Noah (as) and the Prophet Luth (as). The curse given to Aisha is correct because it is against Ali bin Abi Talib, and the person who fights against Ali is the same as against the Prophet (saw), against the Prophet means fighting Allah according to the postulate *ana harbun li man haraba Allah, wa silmum man salam Allah* (I fight anyone who opposes Allah and make peace with whoever is reconciled to Allah). It is not said that the Shia Imayah did not condemn Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman for depriving them of the rights of their imams. If Imam M1 appeared first in Medina and dismantled the tombs of Abu Bakr and Umar so that they could be revived, then Abu Bakr and Umar in Qishah, were crucified on a date palm tree and burned to dust, then the dust would be thrown into the air. TM also criticizes this view, if indeed Imam M1 can bring the dead back to life, then it is the Dajjal.

Third, the Problem of the Pillars of Faith and the Pillars of Islam. In Sunni, the pillars of faith and Islam must come from the Qur'an and hadith, while in Shi'a it is not like there is an additional area in the pillars of Islam and believing in the imam in the pillars of faith.

Fourth, fiqh of the fifth school is the Ja'fary school. TM himself considers that the existing Ja'fary fiqh used by the Shi'a is a lie. Ja'fary fiqh is Sunni fiqh because Imam Abu Hanifah and M3 studied under Imam Ja'far Sadiq. If Imam Ja'far had his madhhab, of course, Imam Abu Hanifah and M3 would not have studied with him, because all Sunni Imams do not believe and mislead the Shia. So in fact, the Shia group only makes a profit and uses the name of an imam who is also worshipped by the Sunni group. Another deviation is related to the period of Imam Ja'far's life until his death, he was always in Medina while Shia figures were in Kufa. Imam Ja'far himself let go of his hand and had no connection with the teachings of Shi'a as he had the harmony of faith and Islam. The difference in the harmony of faith and Islam according to TM makes Shi'a not worthy of being called a madhhab, it must be called a religion. Their religion is not Islam, they are just stealing the brand from Islam. How can Islam be said when the holy book is considered false, its companions are and when asked by the imam of maksum they do not have the same explanation about the pillars of faith and Islam. TM added, if there are

only different sects, then it can still be said to be Islamic because the sect is the ijtihad of scholars, while in Shia teachings it is different from the issue of belief.

Fifth, iImazah. Imamah as believed by the Shi'a has no basis in either the Qur'an or the Hadith. They only make a profit and are suitable because in Shia belief, the imamah is higher than nubuwah. This violates the Qur'anic verse which explains that those who receive blessings are nabiyyin, siddiqin, martyrs, and shalihin. If the imamah is more noble, then it will be mentioned in the verse before the nabiyyin with the expression aimmah. Another verse that is used as the legitimacy of the teachings of Imamah is QS. Al-Baqarah/2:125, according to TM, this verse has nothing to do with Imazah. The notion that Imamah is more important than prophethood makes them disbelieve. The Shi'a faith with the pillars of their faith coupled with the Imamah made them disbelieve in their companions, saying that the Qur'an is false because if the Qur'an is considered authentic, while the Qur'an is the Qur'an agreed upon by the companions who have been considered apostates.

Sixth, his Holiness the Priest. The teachings of immorality also make them because there is no one who is great after the Prophet Muhammad PBUH as in QS. Al-Ahzab/33:40, because the Prophet Muhammad is the concluding of the prophets. To admit an imam is to say that the imam received revelation. TM quoted a conversation in the midst of the Shia group, "One of his companions said, O Imam, could it be that you have faced a problem that did not exist in the time of the Prophet? Then if you find such a problem, how can you answer a new problem, come to me and tell Jibril". This is the same as saying that the Imam received revelation. Indirectly, it will cause the creed to be invalid because in the creed it must be admitted that the last Prophet is the Prophet Muhammad (saw).

Seventh, taqiyyah. According to TM, taqiyyah is bathed in four parts, namely taqiyyah khaufiyyah (if you feel afraid or worried, you must adjust to the surrounding community), taqiyyah ikrahiyyah (taqiyah because you are forced), taqiyyah mudharatiyyah (seduction by claiming to be brothers because you are both shahada, even if necessary with words such as expressed by Siskani "Ahlussunnah is not only a brother but also our own soul), but in reality, in the teachings of Shi'a, zakat should not

be given to Ahlussunnah because it is considered. *taqiyyah kitamniyyah* (tightly closed, even more Sunni than Sunni).

From the explanation of the trip experienced, TM felt grateful because he could get to know Shi'ah well. TM concluded that Shia was a Jewish and Persian conspiracy. The reason the Companions were targeted was because the Jews were expelled from Medina because the Companions were destroyed while Persia was destroyed by Umar bin Khattab. Then why is it hostile to Muslims because they think that Umar became so because of the education of the Qur'an. The Companions apostatized so that they could have a part to say that the Qur'an had undergone *tahrif* or distortion.

#### **4. Analysis of Shi'a Da'wah Methods in Sampang-Madura Through Religious Moderation**

The Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in 2022 launched a book entitled *Thematic Interpretation: Religious Moderation*. In the next stage, the implementation of the Religious Moderation program will run more systematically, planned, and sustainable, following the issuance of a new regulation, namely Presidential Regulation Number 58 of 2023 concerning Strengthening Religious Moderation. This was confirmed by the Special Staff of the Minister of Religion for Media and Public Communication, Wibowo Prasetyo, during the review of Presidential Regulation 58 of 2023 in Yogyakarta, Friday (24/11/2023). Present, Secretary General of the Head of the Center for Religious Harmony (PKUB) of the Ministry of Religious Affairs Wawan Djunaedi. "The regulation set by President Joko Widodo on September 25, 2023 is an important point in the implementation of major policies that have been enshrined in the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). Not only strong in terms of legal umbrella, through Presidential Decree No. 58, the policy of religious moderation programs will also be more structured, synergistic, and of high quality," he said (Khoeron, 2024).

Religious moderation as referred to in the book *Thematic Interpretation: Religious Moderation* is defined as a religious worldview, attitude and practice. So what is moderated is not religion itself but religious approaches, both in the form of religious

thought and behavior. In the same book, the principles of religious moderation are explained (Lanjah Pentashihan Al-Qur'an, 2012, p. 8).

First, fairness and balanced, such as justice between rights and obligations, justice between reason and revelation, text and context, this world and the hereafter, justice between *sawabit* and *mutaqayyat*, justice between individual and social aspects, and justice between religion and state. Second, *Amar makruf nahi mungkar*, such as the moderate attitude between ignoring and exceeding the limits in *Amar makruf nahi mungkar*, the moderate attitude between gentle and hard in *Amar makruf nahi mungkar*.

Third, providing ease in religious practice. Fourth, pay attention to the principle of gradualism (Lajnah Pentashihan al-Qur'an, 2012). Indeed, there are some attitudes from the Shia group that are triggered by emotional response from the local community. First, fairness and balanced. This attitude is important in Islamic da'wah to bring harmony in the social life of the community. What happened in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages is da'wah that does not pay attention to justice and balance, so it is not surprising that it presents conflicts (Ahwani & Hasiolan, 2025). For the record, Sunni teachings are teachings that have become very strong among the people of Madura in general, especially in the villages of Karang Gayam and Blu'uran. The Shi'a cannot ignore this fact, to consider all kinds of da'wah actions that they will use. Because changing something that has taken root is not an easy task and can be completed overnight (Hasiolan & Mufidah, 2025).

Second, *amar Makruf nahi mungkar*. *Amar amkruf* and *nahi mungkar* are two phrases combined, each phrase must be properly understood. *Amar makruf* is to command the good that is commanded in religion and beneficial to the good of the individual and society, while *nahi mungkar* is to prevent any evil that is prohibited in religion and harms individuals and society. If returned to Shi'a da'wah in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages, it can be seen that da'wah hurts the local community. Da'wah divides society into several groups and of course the culmination is the bloody conflict between Sunni and Shia groups. Efforts to invite the good must not give rise to new evils. If there is good called and then causes a new evil, it will be an indication that there is something wrong in the way of conveying goodness.



Third, providing ease in religion. Just as the Prophet when delivering his da'wah and then being faced with two choices, the Prophet always chooses the easiest thing. If the Shia want to preach their teachings, they should not impose it on the local community. It can be seen that since the emergence of Shi'a teachings in the villages of Karang Gayam and Blu'uran, many families have been divided, such as children who do not know their parents or vice versa, husbands who do not know their wives or vice versa, so that these teachings burden the community, especially from the lower class.

Fourth, pay attention to the principle of gradualism. One of the reasons why the goal of da'wah is not achieved is to ignore the gradual principle. When da'wah is delivered, it will more or less cause social change (Nasution & Lubis, 2025). The stronger or greater the change produced, the greater the conflict will be caused. One of the things that caused conflicts in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Villages was that due to the magnitude of social changes that had been produced, so that many community groups were not ready to face these changes, especially Sunni teachings that have long been rooted in the community. The great social changes also show the magnitude of the pressure of da'wah conveyed so that the preachers want to change society in a short time.

Dealing with conflict requires seriousness and appropriate action whether in pre-conflict conditions, in conflict or post-conflict. It is recognized that conflicts fluctuate depending on the influencing factors (Abdi, 2024). The way that can be taken in the pre-conflict period is to promote moderate thinking through religious texts (Afwadzi et al., 2024). Although there are actually those who have done it in universities such as UIN Malang, Darussalam University Gontor-Ponorogo and As'adiyah Sengkang University (Nasir & Rijal, 2021), although research on moderation and conflict fluctuates in Islamic universities and focuses on communal and interreligious conflicts (Rusmulyadi et al., 2021). Teaching religious moderation encourages students to gain a more qualified understanding of the Qur'an, so that they can develop better reasoning, understanding, and professional skills (Syarif, 2021). This can be done through multicultural education (Mursalin et al., 2024), character education and contextual learning (Hertanto et al., 2022). Even through the resolution of conflicts in the family, it can also be a learning realm (Izzul Islam & Misbahuzzulam, 2024). Syahraini detailed several approaches; being

tolerant and living in harmony, supervising Islamic spiritual activities, accompanying religious activities, instilling moderate Islamic teachings, conveying comprehensive (*kaffah*) Islamic teachings, and engaging dialogue on equality in learning (Tambak, 2021). Indeed, the potential for Islamic students to be exposed to radical activists is high. Through categorization, interpretation and analysis, it was found that the concept and spread of radicalism was more influenced by religious interpretations than social tolerance factors (Nafi'a et al., 2022). However, this does not mean that pluralism education without challenges, even in the 2000s, for example, pluralism was forbidden to be followed through the MUI fatwa (Rustang, 2024).

In addition, religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, Al-Jam'iyatul Washliyah which is committed to continuing to teach religious moderation even though faced with severe challenges with the rise of conservative Islamic understandings that position religion as rigid and exclusive. HarNU, for example, through the Dutch PCINU in order to combat Islamophobia, has campaigned for Islamic moderation through "Islam Nusantara" in a *multitrack manner*. Although basically the existence of conflicts and proper resolution can also be beneficial for each group in the future.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the preaching of Shia groups in Sampang-Madura, especially in the villages of Karang Gayam and Blu'uran, was contrary to the principle of religious moderation put forward by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. These include the principle of justice and balance, the principles of amar makruf and nahi mungkar, the principle of ease in religious practice, and the principle of gradualism. When these principles are ignored, it is not surprising that there are bloody conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites in the villages of Karang Gayam and Blu'uran. Therefore, what has been proclaimed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia by publishing a guidebook on preaching entitled "*Thematic Interpretation: Religious Moderation*", is a mandatory reading for preachers before entering a multicultural society like Indonesia.

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